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On the 
Origins of 
Islamic Law 
by T. W. Lapin 
American lawyers and law students 
who think about Islamic law - and, 
presumably, there are very few of 
us - probably think first of the 
lopping-off of hands for theft or of the re-
cent execution of Prince Faisal of Saudi 
Arabia. Assuredly, there is considerably 
more to Islamic legal thought than the 
dismemberment of criminals. Due to the 
increased importance of the Islamic 
World in international affairs, I believe 
that some acquiantance with the legal 
system affecting the lives of more than 
500,000,000 Muslims throughout the 
world would benefit those of us who 
would practice law in a society which, for 
better or worse, is daily increasing its 
economic, political and military contacts 
with the Middle East. This is the first of a 
series of articles written to that end: an at-
tempt to give the aspiring lawyers of 
America some insights into the legal sys-
tem of a no longer ignorable vast area of 
the world. 
Muslim philosophy regards religion 
and law as being two humps on the same 
camel; both religion and law are divinely 
revealed, they are fundamentally im-
mutable and inseparable. The opposite 
legal philosophy stands behind the 
Roman and Anglo-American law codes 
of the West which are the results of legal 
deliberation and, hence, are open to 
change under the same machinery 
which engendered them. More simply 
stated, Islamic law is religious while 
Western law is, for the most part, secular 
in nature. 
Islamic law encompasses a far greater 
field than would ever be regulated by the 
Roman or Anglo-American legal sys-
tems; all of mankind's conduct is, in one 
way or another, subject to certain estab-
lished rules of law: public and private, 
national and intemational. Prayer, pil-
grimage, fasting and ritual ablutions are 
covered by Islamic law just as surely as 
are theft, murder, marriage, bailments 
and taxes. The Muslim lawyer serves as a 
consultant for ethical and religious mat-
ters as well as for the criminal and civil 
cases handled by his colleagues in 
Europe, America and elsewhere. Natur-
ally, much of this extensive body of law 
cannot be presented before an earthly 
court; this fact is accepted, and any viola-
tions of the more altruistic ethical rules 
are left to the "bar of Eternity." Islamic 
law has aptly been described as a collec-
tion of "oughts and ought-nots" and a 
"Doctrine of Duties" rather than the 
cornpendium of statutes we are accus-
tomed to in the West. In the Islamic 
scheme of things it is society which must 
bend itself to the standards set by 
divinely-revealed laws; laws are not tools 
fashioned by society to suit society's 
ends. 
Classical Muslim jurisprudence rested 
upon four pillars, the "roots of the law": 
the QUr'an (Koran), the Sunna of the 
Prophet Muhammad, Ijma (consensus) 
and Qiyas (analogical reasoning). The 
Qur'an is the first source of Islamic law; it 
is a collection of revelations similar to, 
but not the same as, the Christian Bible 
or the Judaic Torah. The Qur'an was, 
according to Muslim tradition, revealed 
by God to Muhammad over a period of 
twenty-eight years, beginning in about 
A. D. 612. These revelations were writ-
ten down on scraps of paper, bone, pot-
tery, etc., before eventually being col-
lected and preserved as a single entity. 
Although all of this occurred during the 
first half of the seventh century, the 
Qur' an itself had been written by God (in 
Arabic, of course) and has existed with 
God since before time began. Oddly 
enough, there are very few verses in the 
QUr'an of a purely legal nature. Islamic 
law was, therefore, not taken so much 
directly from the Qur'an as from well-
established customary rules and gov-
ernment practices which the early Mus-
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lim jurists reviewed, amended, rejected 
or accepted depending on the degree to 
which these rules conformed to Islamic 
precepts. 
No one but the ultra-orthodox ever 
maintained that the Qur' an was meant 
to provide a complete set of laws cover-
ing all the facets of human conduct. 
From almost the beginning of post-
Muhammad Islam many laws were 
enacted based upon the Sunna of the 
Prophet. The word "sunna" originally 
meant a "trodden path". It came to 
mean the behavioral path intended by 
Muhammed for his followers. As it 
stands today, the Sunna is an immense 
collection of sayings of the Prophet, as 
well as recollections of what Muhammad 
permitted, forbade, approved of, and 
encouraged. Most of these elements are 
unquestionably fictionalized entries in-
vented after Muhammad's death in 632 
A. D. to suit whatever circumstances 
arose at any given moment. Almost 
everyone recognizes this, but the Sunna 
is still regarded as the second principal 
pillar of the law. The rationale behind 
this is the traditional belief that, although 
individuals can err, God will not permit 
the entire "umma" (Muslim community 
in toto) to be misled. 
Even the voluminous pages of the 
Sunna could not provide answers for the 
numerous daily challenges presented to 
any legal system. In order to provide 
bases for the rulings in both secular and 
religious cases Islamic jusists began to 
legislate on their own, basing these legis-
lative endeavors on what in their opinion 
(ra'y) would be most acceptable in the 
light of Islamic teaching. It was quickly 
ascertained that this method of legal de-
rivation was far too subjective and falli-
ble to become part of a system of law 
which claimed divine origin. 
This rejection of opinion as an alterna-
tive for producing laws to deal with civil, 
criminal and ritual matters unspecified 
in either the Qur'an or the Sunna led to 
the practice of "qiyas", or "analogy," 
based on both the Qur'an and the 
Sunna. When confronted with an issue 
upon which no clear judgment had been 
made by either the Qur' an or the Sunna, 
a verse from either one of these au-
thoritative sources most nearly parallel-
ing the case at hand was taken and an 
analogy drawn from whatever could be 
most reasonably inferred from the given 
verse(s). The results of this practice vary 
from one extreme to the other, with 
some analogies being remarkably well 
derived and others reaching out towards 
the far limits of often fertile imaginations. 
Eventually, the qiyas system became 
fairly well organized, being based on 
precedents deriving from the extensive 
work of a number of imminent Muslim 
jurists in the holly city of Madina (near 
Mecca), then the center of the Islamic 
empire. In the early eighth century the 
concept of "ijtihad", or "systemic origi-
nal thinking", came into its own. The 
name of this practice is self-explanatory, 
and suffice it to say that ijtihad engulfed 
the qiyas system within a century. 
This brings us to "ijma'." The use of 
this practice of judging the legal status of 
a particular pro blem by consensus of the 
people who could reasonably be con-
sidered to have some authoritative 
knowledge of the issue of the case at 
hand began where the formative period 
of the components of the Sunna ended, 
i.e. after the death of Muhammad. The 
"consensus" was originally derived from 
the opinions of a group of men called the 
Companions ofthe Prophet. These were 
men who had been among the earliest 
followers of Muhammad during the 
Prophet's lifetime; their prestige in mat-
ters of religion has remained strong 
among Muslims to this day. The Com-
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panions were never regarded as perfect 
or infallible, but their views on religious 
issues always carried considerable 
weight. Indeed, much of the develop-
ment of the Hadith (sayings of the Pro-
phet) and of the Sunna itself occurred 
under the auspices and with the assis-
tance of these men. 
"Ijaa' " eventually became simply the 
opinion of qualified lawyer-theologians, 
based on the Qur'an and the Sunna. 
(Lawyers during most of Islamic history 
have been theologians as well; the re-
verse was not necessarily always the 
case.) "Ijma'" was regarded as au-
thoritative, but not infallible. Again, it 
was taken for granted that an individual 
could be wrong, but it was always held 
that the "umma" (Muslim community in 
toto) could never err in important mat-
ters of religion because such an occurr-
ence would never be allowed by God. In 
this context many modern writers have 
drawn parallels between the concept of 
ijma' and the "ex cathedra" declarations 
of the Roman Catholic Church. 
The great body of Islamic law may be 
referred to by the word "Sharl'a". The 
original meaning of "sharl'a" was a 
"path leading to water"; as Islam origi-
nated in a country which is almost en-
tirelyarid, the emphasis which water re-
ceived as a symbol of the creation and 
maintaining force of life cannot be overly 
stressed. The Sharl'a is the way which 
God ordained for men to follow: it en-
compasses all mankind and all that 
mankind can do. Islamic laws are, neces-
sarily, part and parcel of the Sharl'a. 
Although the Sharl'a is all-inclusive in 
theory, the factual application of its es-
sentials is another matter: criminal law, 
administrative law, constitutional law 
and commercial law were all quite be-
yond the power of the Sharl'a to regulate 
completely and, hence, to control. Be-
cause of its rigid and exacting nature the 
Sharl'a became moribund. To handle 
the daily needs of an expanding society, 
courts of complaints, inspectors of mar-
kets, police and informal courts of mer-
cantile arbitration arose very early in Is-
lamic history. There was no rival code: 
the Sharl'a remained supreme in this re-
spect, and the other forms of jurisdiction 
were never officially recognized as such. 
As Islamic society matured, courts 
were established in which the adminis-
tration of the law was entrusted to judges 
called "qadls", who were appointed by 
the state. Drawn from the " 'ulama' ", 
that body of men learned in matters of 
religion and religion-sanctioned sci-
ences, these judges, because they were 
state-appointed, soon became tools of 
whomever wielded power at any given 
time. Many of the more virtuous mem-
bers of the 'ulama' would refus to accept 
appointment as judges, feeling that their 
personal integrity could easily be com-
promised by unscrupulous commands 
from above. In addition to courts ad-
ministered by qadis, the sultan held 
"mazalim" courts for the relief of per-
sonal wrongs. These mazalim courts 
often functioned much as do the appel-
late courts of our own system. In these 
courts the sultan himself dispensed 
judgement according to his own feelings 
on the case at hand. The third major type 
of court was the so-called department of 
"moral practice", or "ihtisab," which 
superintended public morality and made 
immediate judgments on readily appar-
~nt crimes such as those involving de-
fective scales, counterfeit money, adul-
terated commodities and other com-
mercial violations. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, 
the Sharl'a courts within the Ottoman 
Empire (which, at that time, included 
most of the Islamic World) were reduced 
in authority to the handling of family dis-
putes and questions of personal status. 
In some parts of the Islamic World these 
courts continued to function well into the 
twentieth century, although by and large 
they have been replaced by Western- . 
style civil courts. 
The legal reforms instituted in the Ot-
toman Empire during the last century are 
beyond the scope of this article; they did, 
however, provide the background for 
the eventual practices of formulating 
modern legal codes which became 
popular in many parts of the Islamic 
World after the First World War. 
Today there are essentially three legal 
systems in use in Muslim countries: 1.) 
Those countries in which the Sharl'a is 
still the fundamental law of the land; 2.) 
Countries which have abandoned the 
Shari'a altogether in favor of entirely 
secular law; and 3.) Countries using a 
system based on a compromise between 
the two. 
In the first category are countries such 
as Saudi Arabia, Libya, and 'Oman -
traditionalist countries with highly con-
servative governments and populations. 
In Saudi Arabia, for example, there is 
very little Western-inspired legislation. 
Any legislation contrary to the tenets of 
Islam is forbidden, as is evidenced by Ar-
ticle 6. of the "Fundamental Law of al-
Hejaz": "Legislation in the Kingdom of 
al-Hejaz shall always conform to the 
Book of God (Le. the Qur'an), the 
Sunna of the Prophet and the conduct of 
the Prophet's Companions and pious 
Follwers". (Al-Hejaz was once an inde-
pendent kingdom comprising the nuc-
leus of what is now the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. This development of 
modern Saudi Arabia took place in the 
1920's and '30's.) 
In the second category is Turkey, a 
case unto itself in which the official, 
Europeanized law of the land is still re-
jected by a large element of the popula-
tion in favor of traditional Islamic law re-
garding family matters, marriage, religi-
ous observances, etc. 
It is to the third category that most Is-
lamic nations belong. Egypt, Syria, 
Lebanon, the Sudan, 'Iraq, Tunisia and 
Jordan, for example, have yielded to 
popular sentiment dictating that, instead 
of the borrowing of a foreign code, 
adequate modern, national legal sys-
tems be derived from the Sharl'a. 
Tunisia has developed a truly en-
lightened legal code using this impetus, 
and many of the other Islamic states 
have followed suit, albeit via heavy bor-
rowing of some provisions of French and 
British law. 
While in many parts of the Islamic 
World the old, traditional legal systems 
have been replaced by those found~d 
upon other models, the fundamental 
guide of them all has been the need to 
retain at least some of the flavor and 
philosophy of the law dictated by the re-
ligion they all share. The religion plays 
an indispensable role in the life of every 
citizen and resident of these states and, 
increasingly, is affecting everyone of us. 
NOVEMBER, 1975 ~ 
